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Abstract 
 
Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model is used to derive the regulatory 
capital formula of Internal Ratings-Based approach in the new Basel accord 
(Basel II). One of the important assumptions in ASRF model for credit risk is that 
the given portfolio is well diversified so that one can easily calculate the required 
capital level by focusing only on systematic risk. In real world, however, 
idiosyncratic risk of a portfolio cannot be fully diversified away, causing the so 
called concentration risk problem. In this paper we suggest simulation based 
approach for measuring concentration risk using bank capital dynamic model. 
This approach is especially suitable for a portfolio with relatively small to 
medium number of obligors and relatively large sized loans.  
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Simulation based approach for measuring 
concentration risk 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In recent years, many important advances have been made in modeling credit risk of 
a portfolio. One of them is Asymptotic Single Risk Factor (ASRF) model, which is used 
to derive the regulatory capital formula of Internal Ratings-Based approach in the new 
Basel accord (Basel II). 
Under the ASRF framework there are only two sources of risk, systematic risk and 
idiosyncratic risk. As the number of obligors in a portfolio increases, idiosyncratic risk 
is diversified away, so its contribution to portfolio risk disappears. Thus, one can easily 
calculate required capital level by focusing only on systematic risk under the ASRF 
assumptions. In real world, however, a bank’s portfolio is often not sufficiently 
diversified. The fact that there are some large exposures in the portfolio implies that   
there is a residual of undiversified idiosyncratic risk in the portfolio. Under these 
circumstances, IRB formula in the Basel accord underestimates the required regulatory 
capital. Some historical examples such as insolvency of Enron, Worldcom and Parmalat 
show the dangers of misunderstanding concentration risk.1 
The approaches for measuring concentration risk suggested in recent studies can be 
categorized into two different types. The first approach is to adapt indices of 
concentration such as Gini coefficient or Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI). This 
approach is simple and easy to perform. While these indices could be good measures for 
concentration itself, they do not seem to serve well for concentration risk because they 
do not take distribution of different quality obligors into consideration. The second 
approach is granularity adjustment suggested by Gordy (2003). Its difficulties in   
implementation and huge data requirement make it hard to be performed in practice.  
Usually practitioners use both approaches to measure the concentration risk of their 
portfolio. While the concentration measurement index such as HHI could not measure 
the actual risk accurately, granularity adjustment sometimes overestimates the actual 
concentration risk of a portfolio. 
                                            
1 Bundesbank(2006): Concentration risk in credit portfolios, monthly report, June 
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In this paper, we introduce a simulation based approach to measure concentration 
risk. We show that HHI could not provide enough information to measure the actual 
concentration risk. With the proposed approach, we are able to calculate the amount of 
required capital for concentration risk directly. We believe that the approach is 
especially suitable for banks with portfolios of relatively small number of obligors with 
relatively large size of loans. 
This paper is organized as follows. In section 2, we present detailed descriptions of 
concentration risk and Herfindahl-Hirshman Index, respectively. Section 3 explains the 
frameworks of our simulation based approach to measure concentration risk. Section 4 
provides some numerical results based on the actual example and explains the 
implication of those numbers. Section 5 concludes the paper.  
 
2. Concentration risk under Basel II framework 
 
2.1 The IRB model and concentration risk 
 
In this section, we provide a brief summary on the key assumptions of the 
Asymptotic Single-Risk Factor (ASRF) model that is used to calculate the regulatory 
capital requirement by Basel II. In the risk factor model frameworks that underpin the 
Internal Ratings-Based (IRB) risk weights of Basel II, credit risk of a portfolio is caused 
by two main sources, systematic and idiosyncratic risks.2 
Systematic risk represents the effect of unexpected changes in macroeconomic and 
financial market conditions on the performance of borrowers. Borrowers may differ in 
their degree of sensitivity to systematic risk, but few firms are completely indifferent to 
the wider economic conditions in which they operate. Therefore, the systematic 
component of portfolio risk is unavoidable and only partly diversifiable. Meanwhile 
idiosyncratic risk represents the effects of risks that are particular to individual 
borrowers. As a portfolio becomes more fine-grained, in the sense that the largest 
individual exposures account for a smaller share of total portfolio exposure, 
idiosyncratic risk is diversified away at the portfolio level. This risk is totally eliminated 
in an infinitely granular portfolio (one with a very large number of exposures) as 
unsystematic risk vanishes in Capital Asset Pricing Model. 
The ASRF model framework underlying the IRB approach is based on two key 
assumptions. The first one is that bank portfolios are perfectly fine-grained and the 
                                            
2 BCBS(2006): Studies on credit risk concentration, working paper, Basel 
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second one is that there is only one source of systematic risk. When these two 
assumptions hold, one can easily calculate required capital level depending on only one 
systematic risk. In case of well diversified portfolio, the capital required for a loan does 
not depend on the portfolio it is added to. This simplicity makes the new IRB 
framework applicable to a wider range of countries and institutions. However, if any of 
two assumptions is violated, there is no guarantee that the IRB approach and ASRF 
model will be accurate. The violation of the assumption of the fine-grained portfolio 
leads to concentration risk problem. Concentration of exposures in credit portfolios 
arises from imperfect diversification of idiosyncratic risk in the portfolio. The small to 
medium size of credit portfolio or some large exposures to specific individual obligors 
can lead to concentration risk. 
 
2.2 Herfindahl-Hirshman Index 
 
The Herfindahl-Hirshman index3 (HHI), better known as the Herfindahl index, is a 
statistical measure of concentration. The HHI accounts for the number of firms in a 
market, as well as concentration, by incorporating the relative size of all firms in a 
market. It is calculated by squaring the market shares of all firms in a market and then 
summing the squares, as follows: 
 
∑
=
=
n
i
iMSHHI
1
2)( ,                         (1) 
 
where iMS  is market share of i th firm and n is the number of firms. 
Well-diversified portfolios with a very large number of very small firms have an 
HHI value close to zero whereas heavily concentrated portfolios can have a 
considerably higher HHI value. In the extreme case of a monopoly, the HHI takes the 
value of one.  
In the context of the measurement of concentration risk, the HHI formula is 
included as a main component of a number of approaches. But HHI itself has some 
drawbacks to be used for measuring concentration risk. At first, it does not consider 
distribution of exposures across credit ratings, so portfolios with the same HHI values 
can have different sizes of concentration risks. Secondly, it does not allow concentration 
risk to be expressed directly as economic capital, so it needs additional functions to 
                                            
3 Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System (1993): The Herfindahl-Hirshman 
Index, Federal Reserve Bulletin, March, pp 188-189. 
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calculate economic capital for concentration risk. 
 
3. Framework for simulations 
 
In this section, We introduce the framework for simulations presented in Peura and 
Jokivuolle(2003) and how to use this bank capital dynamics model to calculate 
concentration risk. 
 
3.1 Bank capital dynamics based on rating transitions 
 
To model bank capital dynamics and required capital buffers and to avoid confusion 
of notations, we use three different types of bank capital, the actual capital, the 
regulatory capital and the economic capital. The actual capital is bank’s actual capital 
and denoted by . The regulatory capital is the minimum regulatory capital charge of 
Basel II and denoted by . And the economic capital is minimum capital level 
calculated by bank without considering regulatory capital. Now let there be a bank with 
assets consisting of illiquid corporate loans. Under Basel II framework, the actual bank 
capital must satisfy equation (2). 
tA
tR
 
tt RA ≥                               (2) 
 
Equation (2) gives us intuition how to determine initial actual capital of a bank. By 
calculating required initial actual capital subject to equation (2), we can have the 
required capital amount for credit risk of a portfolio. 
Now, to model bank’s actual capital dynamics, we assume that the bank’s profit 
occurs before credit losses during period t. The bank’s credit loss during period t is 
denoted by  and the dividends paid out of the bank capital at time t by , the issues 
of new equity at time t by . Now, the bank’s capital dynamics can be determined by 
tL tV
tS
 
11111 +++++ +−−+= tttttt SVLIAA .                 (3) 
 
The bank determines the actual capital level preparing for severe macroeconomic 
downturns. In those conditions when capital is insufficient, it is natural to assume that 
there are no dividends. And also in macroeconomic downturns, it is hard to issue new 
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equity. So, with little loss of generality, we can assume that both the  and the  
terms in equation (3) equal zero in all scenarios. Now we can express the capital 
dynamics that we simulate as 
1+tV 1+tS
 
111 +++ −+= tttt LIAA                        (4) 
 
By rolling the difference equation (4) forward, we can get the capital at time t from 
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The equation (5) implies that the bank’s capital dynamics are determined by two 
stochastic factors, the cumulative net profit and the cumulative change in the minimum 
capital requirement. Now, we need to model bank income, credit losses and regulatory 
capital in order to simulate the dynamics of a bank’s capital. The bank income and 
credit losses depend on rating transitions because they depend on default events of 
obligors. Obligors’ defaults can be simulated based on rating transitions model. And 
also regulatory capital can be simulated by rating transitions because IRB formula of 
Basel II needs credit ratings of obligors as a component. In Peura and Jokivuolle (2003), 
they used a one-factor version of the CreditMetrics™ framework (J.P. Morgan, 1997) as 
rating transitions, extended with an underlying conditioning variable which is 
interpreted as business cycle state. The Creditmetrics model takes the transition 
probability matrix of ratings as given, which is determined by the business cycle state in 
Peura and Jokivuolle (2003). In particular, they assume that the business cycle variable 
is a two-state, time homogenous, Markov Chain, whose possible states are ‘expansion’ 
and ‘recession’. In Bangia et al.(2002), they used models of ratings dynamics of this 
type. 
Credit portfolio models are typically implemented as one-period simulations with an 
annual horizon. However, because banks in most countries report their capital adequacy 
to their regulators quarterly, multi-period simulations of rating changes should be 
performed in quarterly time increments. Both the rating transition probabilities and the 
regime transition probabilities in this simulation are quarterly probabilities estimated 
based on US data. The conditional transition matrices for the expansion and the 
recession states are from Bangia et al.(2002), which are based on Standard and Poor’s 
data on US corporate ratings over the period 1981-1998. The regime switching 
probabilities have been estimated from quarterly data on US business cycles over 1959-
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1998. The stationary distribution of the business cycle state implied by this transition 
matrix is (79%, 21%). 
Now we will explain how the evolution of ratings in this model determines bank 
income, credit losses. For convention of notations, we define an indicator variable  
which assigns 1 when i th obligor of the bank’s portfolio defaults at time t, otherwise 0. 
tiD ,
 
,
,
1 (
0
i t
i t
with probability PD k
D
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)
, )i t
,                    (6) 
 
where unconditional default probability corresponding to rating  by . 
Regulatory capital is determined by the capital charge function of Basel II and rating 
transitions. Bank income is determined by interests of loans and usually interests are 
determined directly proportional to expected loss of loans. Credit losses are determined 
by default events. Using these properties, we can express the variables ,  and  
defined earlier equations in terms of the following sums over obligors in the bank’s 
portfolio: 
,i tk ,( )i tPD k
tR tI tL
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where  is the capital charge function of Basel II, which takes the default 
probability as an argument.  is the credit rating of obligor  at time t.  is 
the nominal exposure of obligor . 
)(⋅f
tik , i iEAD
i β  is a parameter which indicates the ratio of the 
nominal loan margin to the expected loss rate (the unconditional default probability 
times the loss given default percentage) in the portfolio.  is the loss given default 
to nominal exposure ratio.  is the number of obligors in the bank’s portfolio at time 0. 
Formula (9) implies that the bank earns income as a fixed multiple of its unconditional 
expected loss rate. 
iLGD
n
We assume that the underlying asset value correlations, which together with the 
transition probabilities determine the rating transition correlations, do not depend on the 
state of the business cycle. Consistent with the IRB capital charge formula, we use 
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correlation formula of Basel II. 
Now, we have bank’s capital dynamics and this result must satisfy equation (2). For 
convenience of notation, we define capital buffer , which is the difference between 
the bank’s actual capital and the regulatory capital. It can be interpreted as capital buffer 
to absorb the risk from uncertainty and given by 
tB
 
ttt RAB −=                            (10) 
 
Holding capital buffer means an opportunity cost for banks. In this point of view, 
requiring equation (2) to hold in all possible states of the world is not economical to the 
bank. Therefore banks use value-at-risk type probabilistic regulatory capital requirement 
to calculate the size of capital buffer. Value-at-risk is defined as the α th percentile of 
the distribution and the constraint of VaR can be expressed as 
 
0
min 0tt TP B α≤ ≤⎡ ⎤≥ ≥⎣ ⎦ ,                           (11) 
 
where α  is a confidence level associated with regulatory capital adequacy, such as 
99% or 99.9%. The dynamics of  depend on the initial capital buffer  because 
 is increasing in . By substituting equation (5) into equation (10), and applying 
the inequality (2), we can express the regulatory capital requirement at time t: 
tB 0B
tB 0B
 
00
11
0 ≥+−−+= ∑∑
==
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t
s
s
t
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Here the capital buffer at time t is expressed in terms of the initial capital buffer, the 
inflows and outflows of capital between time 0 and time t, as well as the change in the 
regulatory capital charge tR  between time t and time 0. In particular,  is the capital 
charge associated with the bank’s initial portfolio evaluated based on ratings of the 
assets in the portfolio at time t. By simulation based on capital dynamics explained 
above, we can calculate a minimum value for  which satisfies equation (12) and we 
denote it with 
tR
0B
0Bˆ . The required initial capital buffer 0Bˆ  is given by 
 
{ }0 0 0ˆ inf : min 0tt TB B P B α≤ ≤⎡ ⎤= ≥⎣ ⎦ ≥                    (13) 
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Now, by assuming that equation (13) determines the capital buffer, we can calculate 
initial bank capital as 
 
0 0
ˆ ˆ
0A R B= + ,                         (14) 
 
where 0Aˆ  is required initial capital for credit risk of a loan portfolio. 
 
3.2 Measuring concentration risk 
 
Simulations based on bank capital dynamics model introduced in previous section 
provide required capital minimum level directly from distribution of bank’s initial actual 
capital. However, in this paper, we need additional simulation and model extensions to 
calculate concentration risk. Any given portfolio, there exist a benchmark portfolio 
which have no concentration. Now using simulations, we can calculate required initial 
capital levels for these two portfolios, real one and benchmark case. The difference 
between these two values is additional required capital caused by concentration in the 
real portfolio. In Peura and Jokivuolle(2003), they form portfolios according the given 
quality distributions that each have 100 equal sized loans to stress test bank capital 
adequacy. In this framework, there is no concentration in the portfolio. It is not only 
unrealistic but also unsuitable for our main goal which is to calculate concentration risk. 
Therefore, we form portfolios which have differently sized loans. In order to perform 
the simulation, we need business cycle scenarios. In Peura and Jokivuolle(2003), they 
used various assumptions concerning the initial business cycle state as well as the 
duration of recessions. But we used randomly selected scenarios because the main 
purpose of our model is just to calculate the VaR type criterions from the distributions. 
 
3.3 Testing Herfindahl-Hirschman Index 
 
In the context of the measurement of concentration risk, the HHI formula is 
included as a main component of a number of approaches. But there are two types of 
shortcomings of HHI to be used for measuring concentration risk. Firstly, HHI doesn’t 
take quality of a portfolio into consideration. It implies that the portfolios differently 
distributed across the credit ratings can have the same HHI. In the next section, we form 
two portfolios which have different distributions with the same HHI and show these 
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portfolios have different sizes of concentration risk. Secondly, HHI doesn’t reflect 
location of concentration in a portfolio. Even though distributions of loans in portfolios 
are same, the locations of concentration can differ. If the sizes of loans in portfolios are 
same, then they still have same HHI regardless the locations of concentration. It means 
the portfolios that have concentrations in different credit ratings can have same HHI. To 
show this we form two portfolios which have same distribution of loans across the 
credit ratings but have concentrations in different grades and also show these portfolios 
have different sizes of concentration risk in the next section. 
 
4. Numerical Results 
 
Our simulations results are calculated by following steps. First, we form two sets of 
portfolios. Second, we determine business cycle scenarios. Last, we perform Monte-
Carlo simulations based on bank capital dynamics described above. 
We present our main results subject to the following base case parameters: portfolio 
maturity T equal to 2.5 years, a bank income equal to the unconditional expected credit 
loss( 1β = ), an loss given default of 45% across all obligors( ), and a 
confidence level
0.45iLGD =
α of 99%. We use 1,000 scenarios selected randomly. The number of 
simulations is 1,000 for each scenario. So we have 1,000,000 samples. 
We take representative portfolios of banks from a Federal Reserve Board survey as 
reported by Gordy(2000). The portfolios are reported in Table 1. 
Table 1. Average bank portfolios 
AAA 
AA 
A 
BBB 
BB 
B 
CCC 
0.00 
0.00 
0.04 
0.24 
1.01 
5.45 
23.69 
3
5
13
29
35
12
3
4 
6 
1 
3 
21 
36 
29 
US high quality (%)US average quality (%)S&P grade Default Probability (%) 
US portfolios are from Federal Reserve Board survey, as reported in Gordy(2000). Default 
probabilities are annual default frequencies from S&P data 1981-1998 
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These distributions of portfolios do not reflect concentration because they are 
calculated using exposure based data. In the first case, we form two portfolios using US 
average quality portfolio and two portfolios using US high quality portfolio. In each 
case, the benchmark portfolios have the distributions that each obligor has same 
nominal exposure. Portfolio 1 has concentration in credit rating of BB of average 
quality portfolio. Portfolio 2 has concentration in the same grade of high quality 
portfolio. In order to eliminate the effect of location of concentration, we let both 
portfolios have concentrations in the same grades. 
 
     
Portfolio 1 
AAA AA
A
BBB 
BB 
B
CCC
0
5
10 
15 
20 
25 
30 
35 
40 
Portfolio 2 
40
35
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
AAA AA
A
BBB
BB
B CCC 
Fig. 1. The distributions of portfolio 1 and 2. Each portfolio has concentration in shaded 
area. 
 
These two portfolios have two obligors which have exposures of about 10% out of 
total portfolio exposures. And two portfolios have the same HHI (0.272). Table 2 shows 
the main result of simulations. 
 
Table 2. Initial actual capitals of portfolios (%) 
Average quality portfolio High quality portfolio  
Benchmark Portfolio 1 Benchmark Portfolio 2 
Initial actual 
capital 8.7 11.1 5.8 7.9 
Additional 
capital  2.4  2.1 
 
The differences between each portfolio and benchmark portfolio are additional 
required capitals arise from concentration. It can be interpreted as additional risks from 
concentrations. In this case, the additional risk of portfolio 1 is 2.4% and the additional 
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risk of portfolio 2 is 2.1%. The difference 0.3% is large enough to conclude that the 
concentration risk from differently distributed portfolios with same HHI can be different. 
In the second case, we form three portfolios using US average quality portfolio. The 
benchmark portfolio has the distribution that each obligor has same nominal exposure. 
Portfolio 1 has concentration in credit rating of BBB. Portfolio 2 has concentration in 
BB. 
 
    
Portfolio 2 (%) 
AAA AA
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC 
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Portfolio 1 (%) 
AAA AA 
A
BBB
BB
B
CCC
0 
5 
10
15
20
25
30
35
40
Fig. 2. The distributions of portfolio 1 and 2. Each portfolio has concentration in shaded 
area. 
 
These two portfolios have two obligors which have exposures of about 10% out of 
total portfolio exposures. And two portfolios have the same HHI (0.272). Table 3 shows 
the main result of simulations.  
 
Table 3. Initial actual capitals of portfolios (%) 
 Benchmark Portfolio 1 Portfolio 2 
Initial actual capital 8.7 10.3 11.1 
Additional capital  1.6 2.4 
 
In this case, the additional risk of portfolio 1 is 1.6% and the additional risk of 
portfolio 2 is 2.4%. The difference 0.8% is large enough to conclude that the 
concentration risk from portfolios that have concentrations in different grade with same 
HHI can be different. 
In order to show the problems caused by using HHI for concentration risk measure 
more clearly, we form 1000 randomly selected portfolios(with HHI from 0.012~0.015) 
of average quality portfolio. Fig. 3 shows the scatter diagram for HHI and concentration 
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risk. Using simple linear regression, we found 2R equal to 0.043. It implies that HHI 
could not provide enough information to measure the actual concentration risk. 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Scatter diagram for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index and concentration risk of 
average quality portfolio 
 
5. Conclusion 
 
This paper provides a simulation based approach to measure concentration risk. In 
addition, it is shown that Herfindahl-Hirshman Index can not be a good measure for 
concentration risk. Given bank capital dynamic model, simulations directly provide the 
amount of required capital for concentration risk of a loan portfolio while more simple 
methods such as HHI or Gini coefficient need an additional function. And also it 
provides more precise result, compared with approximation methods such as granularity 
adjustment. It might be more time-consuming than other methods, but it is still the 
better way especially for banks with portfolios of relatively small number of obligors 
with relatively large size of loans. 
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